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Following the arrest of a criminal suspect the
police often find it desirable, and sometimes neces-
sary, to make an intensive search of the suspect's
person. Searches of this kind are conducted with-
out a warrant under the general rule that permits
the search of a suspect as incident to his lawful
arrest. Courts have long recognized the need for
police to search an arrested person as a protective
measure, both to save the officer from harm and
to recover incriminating evidence before it is dis-
posed of by the suspect.'
Legislatures have been virtually silent in regu-
lating searches made incident to a valid arrest.
Appellate courts on the other hand, through their
interpretations of the Fourth Amendment's pro-
hibition against unreasonable searches, have
established a sizable body of law governing the
permissible scope and intensiveness of the inci-
dental search.
This discussion of the problems created by
intensive body searches begins with the premise
that a valid arrest has been made and that some
form of search is permissible. The question to be
considered is whether the scope or methods of
search are reasonable or unreasonable police in-
trusions. The question arises particularly in regard
to three searching techniques that are often hu-
miliating or painful for the suspect and degrading
for the police. The first technique can be identified
as "strip searching," whereby a suspect is disrobed
so that his clothes and body can be examined for
weapons or evidence of crime. The second tech-
nique is the intensive search for evidence suspected
*The opinions and conclusions expressed by the
authors are their own and do not necessarily reflect the
views of the American Bar Foundation.
'The clearest statement of this rule appears in
United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 58 (1950).
of being secreted in a body cavity, such as the
suspect's mouth, stomach and internal tract,
rectum, or vagina. The third consists of taking or
capturing a specimen of the suspect's blood,
urine, or breath for chemical analysis to determine
whether he is under the influence of alcohol or
drugs. References to police practices are based, in
large part, on data from the American Bar Foun-
dation's study of criminal justice administration
and from interviews with officials of the Chicago
Police Department.
STRIP SEARCHING
When a male suspect is arrested he is frisked,'
but normally he is not required to remove his
clothes. Exceptions to this practice exist when the
arrest is made for an offense involving the theft or
possession of small items and there is reason to
believe the items are concealed in the suspect's
clothes. Thus, jewelry, narcotics, and gambling
slips are often found in the lining of wearing
apparel and in shoes. On some occasions clothing
is removed so that it can be subjected to chemical
analysis. The legality of removing the clothes of a
suspect in these circumstances has seldom been
2 Pilot Project Report, The Administration of Crim-
inal Justice in the United States (1958), 7 Vols. (un-
published). The pilot study was done in Michigan,
Kansas, and Wisconsin in 1956-57.
'While a frisk normally amounts to the officer run-
ning his hands over the suspect's clothes to detect a
weapon, it could be more intensive, as in the following
description: "The officer must feel with sensitive fingers
every portion of the prisoner's body. A thorough search
must be made of the prisoner's arms and armpits,
waistline and back, the groin area about the testicles,
and entire surface of the legs down to the feet. The
pat and feel method may be employed when the arrest
is made outdoors and disrobing is not feasible." Priar
& Martin, Searching and Disarming Criminals, 45 J.
Cmu. L., C & P.S. 481 (1954).
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placed in issue on appeal; when it has, the searches
have been upheld.4
More ticklish problems arise in connection with
the search of female prisoners. Departmental
orders usually prohibit policemen from searching
a woman placed under arrest, except for searches
of her handbag or a coat carried on her arm. These
regulations are prompted in large part by a desire
to avoid accusations, or the threat of accusations,
of abuse. However, thorough searches are made
by police matrons at places where female prisoners
are detained. The legal problem arises in regard
to such searches.
It is difficult to make generalizations about
procedures for searching women prisoners. Inter-
views with officials gave some indication of the
practices employed. In Chicago, for example,
women arrestees-about 20,000 annually-are
initially detained at central police headquarters.
Prior to arrival at this detention facility, the
arresting officers, since they cannot make a search
for weapons, protect themselves against the risk
of attack by handcuffing women thought to be
dangerous and transporting them in a vehicle that
has a protective screen between the driver and
the suspect. Policewomen are sometimes used to
search women at the scene of an arrest, but this
is unusual because policewomen are ordinarily
not immediately available. However, when a raid
is planned against an organized crime operation
such as a narcotics ring, policewomen often accom-
pany the raiding party for the express purpose of
making a thorough search of female suspects in-
volved in the unlawful enterprise.
When a search of women prisoners is conducted
at headquarters, the women are first asked to place
their personal items on a table so they can be in-
ventoried and placed in safekeeping. About 90
per cent of the prisoners are then asked to remove
their clothes so that they can be examined for
weapons or contraband. Following this, the pris-
oners are asked to assume a squatting position,
which presumably has the effect of dislodging any
items secreted in the vagina.
According to the experience of the Chicago
police matrons, most of the women prisoners have
criminal records and many have been arrested for
crimes of violence. This explains the high incidence
of body searches. Strip searches are less frequently
used for male prisoners. Such searches are consid-
4Robinson v. U.S. 283 F.2d 508 (D.C. Cir. 1960);
People v. Fiorito, 19 Ill. 2d 246, 166 N.E.2d 606 (1960).
ered by the police to be less regularly necessary
because "field" searches serve to uncover weapons
-the police's main concern-and because men
rarely secrete weapons beyond putting them in
their pockets or belts.
The primary objective of the strip search ap-
pears in practice to be to safeguard the property
and physical well-being of those in custody, rather
than to uncover evidence of crime. All manner of
objects capable of inflicting harm are seized in
routine strip searches. The undergarments of
female prisoners, in particular, are frequent hiding
places for knives, fingernail files, straight razors,
and small firearms. The police are aware that a
self-inflicted injury, suicide attempt, or injury to
another prisoner through the use of such weapons
is apt to result in civil liability for the police or,
in any event, disciplinary action by the depart-
ment for failure to take adequate protective meas-
ures. For this reason any items capable of conver-
sion into dangerous instruments, such as the glass
in a watch or spectacles, are taken from the pris-
oner during the initial detention period. (Requiring
the removal of female attire is also a means of
coping with the problem created by female imper-
sonators or transvestites.)
While it is of secondary concern, evidence of
crime is frequently uncovered by the strip search.
Contraband, such as narcotics or gambling slips,
are from time to time exposed and seized. Even
the squatting exercise will occasionally produce
the aforemention items, according to the police
matrons of the Chicago Police Department..
The lawfulness of these searching practices is
not apt to be challenged because the items seized
are rarely used as a basis for prosecution. Weapons
and contraband are simply confiscated. Discovery
of a large quantity of narcotics, however, may
support a "possession" or "sale" charge. In such
event, the introduction of the evidence could be
challenged on two grounds: first, that the strip
search was an excessive intrusion on the body of
the suspect (and therefore unreasonable) and,
second, that the search was exploratory in that
police were seeking evidence of any crime rather
than preventing destruction of evidence related to
the crime for which the arrest was made.5
5The need for a relationship between the evidence
searched for and the reason for the arrest appears in
cases where officers make an incidental search puisuant
to a traffic arrest. In Taglavore v. U.S., 291 F.2d 291
F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1961), for example, a narcotics sus-
pect was arrested on a traffic warrant. Upon being ap-
proached by the police, he deposited something in his
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These issues have not .been conclusively decided
by the courts. Persuasive arguments can be made
in both directions. In the last analysis, whether
the strip searching is excessive or reasonable
requires a choice between the plain utility for the
purposes mentioned and the equally plain offensive
intrusion they entail.
Whether the search was exploratory is a more
complex problem. If the strip search is a routine
matter, it is an indication that the police are
motivated by a desire to protect the lives and
property of prisoners and not to explore for evi-
dence to support another, more serious charge
than that for which the suspect was arrested.6
Paradoxically, the routine use of strip searches,
which has a non-prosecutorial objective, is more
compatible with "reasonableness of search" limi-
tations than selective strip searching practicesJ
In the occasional situation where a quantity of
narcotics turns up in the course of a routine search,
it could be said that the discovery was a fortuity
and the evidence admissible under the general
rule that permits the seizure of contraband when
it is accidentally discovered.8
Reasoning of this sort, however, may find no
favor in the courts, especially if the cases that
bring strip searching to their attention are ex-
treme situations demonstrating obvious abuse. An
example appears in Lucero v. Donovan,9 a suit
under the Federal Civil Rights Act stemming
mouth. One officer "applied pressure to the suspect's
throat" and saw what appeared to be cigarette paper
in his mouth. A second officer arrived and the suspect
was thrown to the ground. While one officer "sat on
his stomach [ the other officer] ... continued to choke
him until his mouth opened" and a marijuana cigarette
removed. The evidence was held inadmissible because
the traffic arrest was a subterfuge for conducting an
incidental search for narcotics, which was obviously
unrelated to the traffic violation. See also People v.
Watkins, 191. 2d 11, 153 N.E. 2d 253 (1960), Agnello
v. U.S., 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925) and People v. Cona,
180 Mich. 641, 147 N.W. 525 (1914).
6 Searches that can be characterized as "explora-
tory" or as "fishing expeditions" are prohibited. U.S.
v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932).7 There is ample indication that when the searching
activity is motivated by a desire to enforce civil regu-
lations, like health and building inspections, and not
to build a criminal case, the search will be upheld.
Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959), and Ohio ex
rd Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263 (1960).
8 U.S. v. Charles, 8 F.2d 302 (N.D. Cal. 1925)
where it is stated that, in the absence of a search that
is a mere pretext, the seizure of contraband is not only
legal but also mandatory when it is in "plain view"
during a search for another item. See also Abel v.
U.S., 362 U.S. 217 (1960) and Harris v. U.S., 331 U.S.
145 (1947).
1354 F.2d 16 (9th Cir. 1965).
from an unlawful arrest and search, including
abusive treatment at the police station. The
plaintiff, a female, was detained on a narcotics
charge and instructed by a police matron to remove
her clothes, to squat, lean forward, and pull her
own buttocks apart for a visual check for nar-
cotics. She refused. Two policemen were then
summoned to hold the prisoner down while the
matron removed her clothes. The plaintiff alleged
further that the male officers made deprecating
remarks about her nude body as she lay weeping
on the floor. No contraband was found and no
criminal charges were filed. (The district court's
directed verdict for the defendant officers was
reversed on appeal and the case remanded for
jury consideration.)
It would not take many episodes such as this
to persuade the courts in favor of unqualified
prohibitions against strip searching, regardless of
purpose. No doubt, the courts would be inclined
to suppose that the cases typically coming before
them were those typically occurring in the police
station. Possibly, the courts would consider it
beyond the purview of their responsibility to con-
sider the consequences of a prohibition on body
searches upon the safety of jail inmates. Possibly,
too, the end result of such a rule would be that
the police as a general rule would conduct searches
but then drop charges. It is not clear how this
would advance the objectives of the search and
seizure limitations.
RETRIEVING OBJECTS FROm BODY CAVITIES
The body cavity most frequently used to hide
or destroy evidence is the mouth. In the situation
when the police approach a suspect either to
arrest or to question him, the suspect caught with
contraband puts it in his mouth. In these circum-
stances the police usually act fast. If these small
items are to be retrieved before they are swallowed,
there is no alternative to physical force, usually
choking.
Guidelines for determining the lawfulness of
choking a suspect are not easily stated, and the
courts have faced the problem with irresolution.
On the one hand, courts are sensitive to choking
episodes. The view has been taken, for example,
that the question "is not how hard the officers
may choke a suspect but whether he may choke
him at all."'1 On the other hand, emphasis is
10 People v. Martinez, 130 Cal. App. 2d 54, 56, 278
P.2d 26, 27 (1955). The police, suspecting the de-
fendant of carrying narcotics, followed him; when they
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sometimes placed on the proposition that "sus-
pects have no constitutional right to destroy or
dispose of evidence" despite what are obviously
extreme measures to retrieve the evidence,'
The difficulty of balancing these divergent atti-
tudes is reflected in the way courts have strained
in rationalizing their decisions. For example, when
an officer "placed his hand on the defendant's
throat and with his thumb pushed sideways" the
court found the officer's conduct "entirely reason-
able to prevent.., the defendant ... from dis-
posing of evidence"." In further support of this
position the court agreed with the trial judge's
determination that there was, in fact, no choking
because the suspect "was able to breathe, did not
gasp for breath or cry out in pain, and his face
did not turn color"." Another rationalization used
to support the choking of an arrestee is that police
officers, when confronted with the possibility of
the destruction of evidence in the suspect's mouth,
are indulging in a "natural reaction" in order to
preserve incriminating evidence. 4
Although not frequenly expressed, a final reason
for granting some leeway to the police in prevent-
ing the suspect from swallowing evidence is that,
once swallowed, the evidence, if soluble, is lost for
all practical purposes. Retrieving some items from
the stomach or intestinal tract before they decom-
pose means resort to the forcible introduction of
emetics or laxatives. The judicial choice, then, is
in practical terms, one between oral emetics and
intestinal ones, or else nullification of any effec-
tive police measures to prevent digestion of the
evidence.
The courts are significantly more restrictive in
approached his car he put something in his mouth.
One of the officers placed a "choke hold" on the de-
fendant's neck, and they fell to the ground where
Martinez spit out a package of narcotics. The court
rejected the evidence because it was obtained by meth-
ods both brutal and shocking.
11 People v. Brinson, 12 Cal. Rep. 625 (1962).
12 People v. Sanchez, 11 Cal. Rep. 406, 411 (1961).
13 Id. at 409, and also cases cited therein at 411.
14 Commonwealth v. Tunstall, 78 Pa. Super. 359, 115
A.2d 914, 916 (1955). Police observed the suspect
sitting in his car. When they approached he put some-
thing in his mouth. One of the officers put his arm
around the defendant's neck and used force to take
some slips of paper from his mouth. The papers were
policy (gambling) slips. In allowing the evidence the
Court concluded that it "... was not obtained as the
result of any procedure which shocks the conscience or
violates appellant's fundamental constitutional rights.
The conduct of the police officer was the natural reac-
tion to appellant's attempt to destroy incriminating
evidence."
their approach to the, forcible introduction of
emetics than they are with choking to obtain
contraband. This attitude, too, has its paradoxes.
In practice, use of emetics involves less force than
choking. The police normally attempt to get the
suspect's consent to taking an emetic by pointing
out, for example, that the toxic effect of the con-
traband, usually narcotics, will cause serious
injury or death unless immediately regurgitated. 5
However, forcible administration of emetics is
resorted to in narcotics cases because the contra-
band is soluble and thus easily lost in the digestive
tract. Alternatively, the practice is to maintain
surveillance over the suspect so that an insoluble
object, such as a piece of jewelry, can be obtained
after a natural bowel movement. Whatever inva-
sions of privacy such surveillance involves, the
practice is highly desirable from the standpoint of
insuring the admissibility of the evidence obtained.
Forcibly administering either emetics or laxa-
tives calls for harsh measures. An example appears
in Willis v. U.S.'--one of the first notable deci-
sions on the subject. The suspect swallowed a
packet of narcotics. He was arrested, handcuffed,
and taken to a hospital. There his arms and legs
were strapped to a table, his jaws forced open,
cotton pads forced between his teeth, and his
nostrils stopped up to keep his mouth open so a
tube could be forced down his throat and an
emetic introduced. He vomited up a packet of
narcotics. In rejecting the evidence thus obtained
as an unreasonable search and seizure under the
Fourth Amendment, the court, in a rather extreme
15 In United States v. Michel, 158 F. Supp. 34 (S.D.
Tex. 1957) two narcotics suspects were picked up at
the Mexican border and admitted that they had swal-
lowed rubber containers of narcotics. A doctor ex-
plained the hazards of these containers rupturing. Both
agreed to a dose of castor oil. Later one agreed to a dose
of epsom salts, whereupon he vomited up the narcotics.
The other, while handcuffed to a stationary object in
the room from twenty minutes to one hour (despite
the frequent need to visit the rest room), agreed to
taking epsom salts. Later he passed the narcotics
through his alimentary canal. The search was upheld.
The situation may arise where a suspect consents to
an emetic, enema, or laxative because of false or mis-
leading statements regarding the danger of the item
swallowed. In this event courts may regard the ad-
monitions as fraudulent inducements that vitiate con-
sent, as they have done where consent was induced by
the production of a fictitious warrant, Gatewood v.
United States, 209 F.2d 789 (D.C. Cir. 1953), or when
the officer, in order to gain access to a still, falsely told
the suspect, "the boss sent me down to fix the still".
United States v. Reckis, 119 F. Supp. 687, 689 (D.
Mass. 1954).
11 U.S. v. Willis, 85 F. Supp. 745 (S.D. Cal. 1949).
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analogy, reasoned that ". . if the stomach pump
can be justified, then the opening of one's person
by the surgeon's knife can be justified.... [I]f a
search such as was made in the instant case may
be approved, would it not likewise follow that if
the narcotics, after being swallowed, had passed
into the blood stream, some officers might feel it
incumbent upon them to drain the defendant of
part of his life blood in an effort to discover the
hidden narcotics?" This case is similar to Rochin
v. California, with its oft-quoted language that
such tactics were so brutal and offensive as to
"shock the conscience" of-the court.'7
"Shocking the conscience" may be an adequate
guideline in searches in cases such as Willis and
Rochin but it provides little guidance for the wide
range of searches of lesser vigor.'8 The forcible
probing of a suspect's rectum, for example, appar-
ently does not engender nearly the shock or qualms
of conscience that are aroused from the police
tampering with a suspect's stomach. In what is
almost exclusively a: narcotics traffic problem, the
rectal probe is initiated when a narcotics suspect
is examined for a telltale greasy substance around
his anus or by the use of X-ray or fluoroscope to
detect the presence of foreign objects in the large
intestine.
The case most clearly establishing the lawfulness
of a forcible rectal probe in these circumstances is
17 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). Three
deputy sheriffs "having some information that Rochin
was selling narcotics" unlawfully broke into his house.
Rochin was seated on the bed only partially dressed.
The officers were about to seize two capsules lying on
the bedside table when Rochin thrust the capsules into
his mouth. One of the officers grabbed Rochin's throat
in an effort to keep him from swallowing-to no avail.
He was handcuffed, rushed to the nearby hospital, and
strapped to a table while a physician forced an emetic
solution through a tube into his stomach. This "stom-
ach pumping" procedure produced the capsules which
were shown to contain narcotics and which were ad-
mitted as the chief evidence against Rochin in a prose-
cution for possession of narcotics contrary to the Cali-
fornia Health and Safety Code. The Supreme Court
granted certiorari on the grounds that a serious question
was raised as to the due process limitations in a state
criminal proceeding.
justice Frankfurter's majority opinion held that the
police methods employed in securing the evidence
against Rochin "did more than merely offend some
fastidious squeamishness or private sentimentalism
about combating crime too energetically. Rather the
consummation of the search was so brutal as to ap-
proach the techniques of the 'rack and screw.' The con-
viction was brought about by a method which 'shocks
the conscience' and 'offends a sense of justice."'
18 Bachelder, Use of Stomach Pump as Unreasonable
Search and Seizure, 41 J. CRim. L., C. & P. S. 189, 191
(1950-1951).
Blackford v. United States.5 Here the suspect was
stopped at an international boundary line in
California by customs officers and asked to remove
his coat.2 0 Numerous puncture marks were re-
vealed in the veins of his arms. Inspectors then
directed the defendant to remove his clothes
entirely, whereupon they noticed a large quantity
of greasy substance around his anus; the defendant
admitted that he had heroin concealed there. He
was taken to the U. S. Naval Hospital where he
then denied the concealment and resisted a rectal
probe. The heroin was forcibly removed by medi-
cal personnel. The search was upheld as similar
searches have been where there was a valid arrest
and where there is dear evidence that contraband
is present in a body cavity.21
Several considerations may help explain why
the courts are less offended by a rectal probe or
enema than by stomach pumping or the adminis-
tration of an emetic. As to the element of pain
that may be involved, the courts weigh this aspect
of a cavity search against the overall conduct of
the suspect. While characterizing a rectal probe as
a "disgusting sequence",n courts have no great
difficulty, apparently, attributing the necessity for
it to the defendant's choice of an equally disgust-
ing repository in the first place. Conventional
morality may thus supply the formally missing
premise of distinction. This attitude appears to
extend also to the suspect who resists a rectal
probe, causing some degree of pain and the possi-
bility of physical injury. The courts are not willing
to place a premium on the suspect's violent resist-
ance, especially if he is in all other respects treated
19 247 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1957). See also Note, Evi-
dence Forcibly Removed from Body Cavity Admissible in
Federal Court," 58 CoLum. L. Rtv. 565 (1958).
20 Note, 106 U. PA. L. REv. 1165 (1958); Blackford
v. U.S., 247 F. 2d 745 (9th Cir. 1957). Law enforce-
ment problems of this sort occur most frequently in
areas noted for narcotics smuggling, such as the Mexi-
can border where it is estimated that 20% of the nar-
cotics smuggled in are hidden in body cavities.
"Application of Woods, 154 F. Supp. 932 (N.D.
Cal. 1956); In re Guzzardi, 84 F. Supp. 294 (N.D. Tex.
1949); Murgia v. U.S., 285 F.2d 14 (9th Cir. 1960) Ng
Pu Yu v. U. S., 352 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1965); King v.
U.S., 348 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1965).
See, however, Note, 106 U. PA. L. REv. 1165 (1958),
where it is suggested that a search warrant should issue
before an internal bodily search is made even though
it is performed in connection with a lawful arrest. It
would insure that the procedure would be performed in
a clinical fashion by authorized personnel and it would
lessen the possibility of abuse by over-enthusiastic
officers.




civilly. Pain in such circumstances indeed has been
termed "self-inflicted".n In further support of this
position, the courts point out that a rectal probe
"is an uncomplicated and non-hazardous proce-
dure" m with regard to the administration of an
enema, courts have indicated that it is "a very
normal and natural thing to do". 25
Emphasis has been placed, moreover, on the
fact that the contraband in the body cavity may
cause serious injury to the suspect unless promptly
removed. Testimony by medical experts as to the
likelihood of this eventuality has been used to
substantiate the use of force. A final point of
emphasis is the court's willingness to analogize a
cavity probe to forcing a suspect "with narcotics
in a clenched fist to open his hand"16 or cutting
the stitches of the suspect's clothing to recover
contraband contained therein.
The considerations emphasized in justifying
rectal probes were, in the recent case of Blefare v.
United States,2 applied to induced vomiting, dem-
onstrating that there is, or should be, no sound
basis for the difference in the judicial attitude
toward choking, probing, or administering an
2id. at 752. Also, Application of Woods, 154 F.
Supp. 932 (N.D. Cal. 1957). The court held in a situa-
tion involving a rectal probe that the Rochin test was
not controlling. 'f judicial sensitivity is to be aroused
in the instant case, the source of shock lies not in the
efforts of the law enforcement officers, but rather with
the deranged conduct of petitioner".
21 Blackford v. U.S., 247 F.2d 745, 752 (9th Cir.
1957).
25 Ash v. State, 139 Tex. Crim. 420, 422, 141 S.W.
2d 341, 343 (1940).2
6 Blackford v. U.S., 247 F.2d 745, 754 and 753 (9th
Cir. 1957) (concurring opinion).
2 Ash v. State, 139 Tex. Crim. 420, 422, 141 S. W.
2d 341, 343 (1940). The police apprehended the de-
fendant attempting to pawn some stolen rings and
observed him put something in his mouth and swallow.
Over the defendant's objections, the Court admitted
the evidence which had been obtained by an enema-
induced bowel movement. In its opinion the Court
said, "If the rings had remained in defendant's mouth
they [the police] would have had as much right to
search his mouth and secure the rings as if they were
in his pockets." He swallowed them ".. .which war-
ranted them in continuing their search." On rehearing,
the same Court asked: "Could it be said that if a thief
has stolen property, sewed it up in his pocket, or in
the lining of his coat, that the officers would have no
right to cut the stitches or even to injure his clothing
for purposes of legal search?"
2 362 F.2d 870 (9th Cir. 1966). Two men, suspected
of smuggling narcotics across the border, were lawfully
arrested; additional evidence indicated that they
probably had swallowed the contraband. With the
assistance of police, a doctor forcibly introduced an
emetic. The packets of narcotics were vomited up. The
court held this search to be reasonable and therefore
lawful.
enema, on the one hand, and administering an
emetic on the other. The distinction between the
Rochin and the Blefare cases lies in the tola police
conduct in handling the suspects. This includes the
time and place of the initial apprehension and the
basis for probable -cause not only to arrest but also
to believe .the contraband was in the suspect's
stomach.
Upon superficial reading, the ruling in Rochin
seems to be' that the procedures necessary to
pump a stomach by force are sufficiently repug-
nant to violate per se the Fourth or Fourteenth
Amendments. Such a reading, however, may be
naive because of other aggravating factors attend-
ing the Rochin search. Thus, "the court referred to
the unlawful entry into Rochin's dwelling and the
forceful methods employed to prevent him from
swallowing the item only suspected to have been
narcotics. Had the, spect been arrested legiti-
mately and had there beeni adequate proof that he
in fact swallowed narcotics, as in the rectal probe
cases,29 the courts;.'a~ in Belfare, will give greater
weight to the proposition that the Constitution in
no way gives a suspect the.right to use his body as a
sactuary for contraband.
OBTAINNG BODY FLtUm oR BREATH FOR ANALYsrs
IN DRu Dmnvnm CASES
Forty states have chemical test laws, providing
that fifteen hundredths of 1: per cent (0.15 per
cent) of alcohol in the blood of a suspect is prima
facie evidence of his intoxication 0 The extent to
which the police use force in extracting the blood
or capturing the breath of drunk-driving suspects
for chemical analysis is not dear, although there
is some indication that seldom is there a resort to
2 In Blackford, supra, note 22, the suspect told the
officers he had deposited narcotics in his rectum. Fur-
thermore, the officer noticed a greasy substance around
his anus. In Ash, supra note 25, the presence of the
ring in the suspect's lower intestinal tract was made
unmistakably clear-by an X-ray. In U.S. v. Michel,
158 F. Supp. 34 (S.D. Tex 1957), a fluoroscope revealed
the foreign object in the suspect's intestine.
30The 1962 version of the Uniform Vehicle Code,
published by the National Committee on Uniform
Traffic Laws and Ordinances, provides that 0.10% of
alcohol in the blood establishes a prima fade case, but
only three states, Vermont, North Dakota, and North
Carolina, have adopted this change. Committee on
Alcohol and Drugs, National Safety Council, Uses of
Chemical Tests for Intoxication, 1964. Breath analysis is
accomplished by the use of the Harger Drunkometer,
the Breathodizer, the Alcometer, or the Intoximeter.
See DoNiGAN, cHms c TEsTs AND Tnm LAW 91-98
(2d ed. 1966).
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force.3 ' Some states, such as Michigan, prohibit
the use of physical force as a means of obtaining
body fluid or breath, by providing that blood
alcohol tests must be submitted to voluntarily
and in writing.32
Several states have adopted "implied consent"
laws as a means of inducing drunk-driving suspects
to submit to blood alcohol tests. The principle
underlying this type of law is that, as a condition
to the privilege of using the state highways, the
driver is deemed to have given his consent to a
chemical test following a valid arrest for drunk
driving; should the arrestee refuse the test, his
operator's license will be automatically sus-
pended.' These provisions are designed to obviate
the need for physical force by providing other
inducements. Whether they adequately serve this
function is not altogether clear.
There is some evidence that implied consent
laws have not provided sufficient inducement, as
exemplified by a large number of refusals occurring
in large cities in states that have such laws.3 ' On
the other hand, some states, after adoption of
"The National Safety Council reports that the
percentage of drunk-driving arrestees refusing to submit
to a blood alcohol test runs as high as 92% in Cleveland,
80% in Mobile, and 73% in Baltimore. Committee on
Alcohol and Drugs, National Safety Council, UMes of
Chemical Tests for Intoxication, 1964.
3 MIcn. STAT. ANN. § 9.2325 (1960). The authorities
seem to be in agreement that consent is valid even
though the person giving it may be under the influence
of intoxicating liquor. Halloway v. State, 146 Tex.
Crim. 353, 173 S.W.2d 258 (1943); Guenther v. State,
153 Tex. Crim. 519, 221 S.W.2d 780 (1949); Bowden v.
State, 95 Okla. Crim. 382, 246 P.2d 427 (1952); People
v. Quarles, 123 Cal. App. 2d 1, 266 P.2d 68 (1954);
Ray v. State, 233 Ind. 495, 120 N.E.2d 176 (1965).
"The solution to this perplexity rests in the fact that a
person under the influence of intoxicating liquor, as
defined by the penal code, need not be so intoxicated
as to be incapable of entering into a valid agreement,
and yet be sufficiently intoxicated to come within the
statute ....." Jones v. State, 159 Tex. Crim. R. 29, 261
S.W.2d 161 (1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 830 (1953).
"A motorist may be mentally or physically unfit to
operate a motor vehicle due to the excessive consump-
tion of alcoholic beverages and yet his ability to com-
prehend his surroundings and what goes on will be
sufficient in the eyes of the law to permit his valid
consent to a chemical test of his breath or body fluids."
DONIGAN, CHEMICAL TESTS 145 (1st. ed. 1957).
3 See, U-11oaMi VEmCLE CODE, §6-205.1. States
adopting this code in substance are: Connecticut,
Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska,
New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon,
South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, and Virginia.
34 In Minneapolis, Minnesota, in 1964, 1251 tests
were offered and 537 were refused. In Wichita, Kansas,
786 tests were offered and 194 refused. In Kansas City,
Missouri, 2827 tests were offered and 1692 refused.
Committee on Alcohol and Drugs, National Safety
Council, Use of Chemical Tests for Intoxication, 1964.
implied consent laws, have estimated that sub-
missions to blood alcohol tests have substantially
increased. A statement by James P. Hayes,
Deputy Commissioner of the Department of
Public Safety for the State of Iowa, is typical:
"We have no exact figures on the number of refus-
als to take chemical tests before the statute was
passed; however, our best estimation and reports
from the field indicate that there were many more
refusals before the law was enacted". The state of
New York, which was the first to adopt an implied
consent statute, reports that overall refusals for
both state and municipal enforcement agencies
average only about 20 per cent. A comparison of
New York figures with those of states that have
not adopted an implied consent law is strong sup-
port in favor of the legislation.
When force is used, however, the question of its
legality turns on whether it is unreasonable under
the Fourth Amendment.35 Standards for reason-
ableness are construed in light of traditional pro-
cedures of search incident to arrest. Analogies, for
example, have been drawn between taking blood
samples and the taking of fingerprints or the re-
moval of objects from the pockets of a person under
arrest.36 In any event a valid arrest is a necessary
prerequisite.n
p The United States Supreme Court has upheld
the taking of blood from an unconscious drunk-
driving suspectN3 and, more recently, from a sus-
pect over his clear objection on advice of counsel.3
The fact that actual physical force is used is dear
from decisions upholding the police actions, which
obviously involve something more than the simple
insertion of a hypodermic needle,4 or simply
31 The Supreme Court has recently held that taking
a blood sample is not testimonial compulsion that is
prohibited by the Fifth Amendment. Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
36 Davis v. State, 189 Md. 640, 57A.2d 289 (1948).
The "search of the pockets" parallel was used by the
California Supreme Court when it concluded that
search of the blood for evidence of intoxication is
analogous to a search of a man's pockets incident to his
arrest and that if a search of the pockets would be
valid so would extraction of blood for intoxication
tests. People v. Duroncelay, 48 Cal. 2d 766, 312 P.2
690 (1957).
37 State v. Kroening, 74 Wis. 266, 79 N.W.2d 810
(1956).
38 Breithaupt v. Abrams, 352 U.S. 432 (1957).
9 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
40 The extraction technique was deemed reasonable,
for example, when the suspect "drew his arm away when
the nurse first attempted to insert the needle and ...
the ambulance driver held his arm while the nurse
extracted the blood. .. ." People] v. Duroncelay, 48
Cal. 2d 766, 769, 312 P. 2d 690, 692 (1957).
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holding a suspect's head to capture his breath.A
Decisions permitting the use of force are bolstered
by the argument, sometimes made explicit 2 but
more often implicit, that law enforcement agencies
must be given the power to cope with the ever
increasing death and injury toll on the highways,
much of which is due to drivers under the influ-
ence of alcohol.4
The recent Supreme Court case of Schnerber v.
California" holds that states may impose reason-
able forms of compulsion upon drivers lawfully
arrested for drunk driving. But in light of the
language used in Schmerber, it cannot be cate-
gorically stated that physical force is permissible
in all situations. Police actions may run afoul of
the admonition that, while the court would permit
"minor intrusions into an individual's body under
stringently limited conditions", 45 more substantial
intrusions or intrusions under other conditions
may not be permitted. It hardly need be said that
this language falls short of the precision required
for an adequate administrative directive to the
police.
The power of the police to use force in capturing
41 State v. Berg, 76 Ariz. 96, 259 P.2d 261 (1953).
The court held, inter alia, that defendant's person had
not been violated. Said the court: "He was not forced
to exhale breath from his lungs. He exhaled it volun-
tarily and in fact of necessity in order to survive. The
moment his breath passed his lips it was no longer his
to control but became part of the surrounding atmos-
phere which was equally free for use by anyone present
within the orbit of its immediate circulation." The
court indicated the result may have been different had
the officers forced the suspect to exhale. See also People
v. Kiss, 125 Cal. App. 2d 138, 269 P.2d 924 (1954),
where there was conflicting evidence that the police
officer struck the suspect in the stomach and that he
took the test because of fear of further punishment. The
Court allowed the evidence "conceding that violence
was applied" because the results of the test would be
excluded only where the accused "is by threats and
punishment so terrorized into submission that to admit
it would be a mockery and a pretence of a trial".
4 Breithaupt v. Abrams, 35 U.S. 432, 436 (1957).
43 It has been estimated that as many as half of the
almost 50,000 fatal vehicle accidents involve drivers
who have been drinking alcoholic beverages. Alcohwl
Involvement in Traffic Accidents, Accident Facts, 1965
Annual Statistical Report of the National Safety
Council.
44 Note 39, supra.
41These conditions include extractions involving
"no risk, trauma, or pain," and where "fear, concern
for health, or religious scruple" are not present.
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771 (1966). The
Court also indicated that the taking of blood may not
be lawful if "The police initiated the violence, refused
to respect a reasonable request to undergo a different
form of testing, or responded to resistance with in-
appropriate force".
body fluid also has practical limitations. Blood
must be taken in accordance with clinical proce-
dures, which means that a doctor or medical tech-
nician must perform the task. Finding a doctor
willing to take blood over the suspect's objection
may be an obstacle formidable enough to discour-
age the police from using blood alcohol tests. The
advice given doctors by the legal department of
the American Medical Association is not to engage
in any act of medical practice, including the taking
of blood, without the patient's consent. The point
of primary concern to doctors is that the police
directive to take blood or probe a cavity may not
be based on adequate probable cause, hence result-
ing in civil liability for the doctor." One state has
legislation granting doctors immunity from civil
liability for taking blood upon request by a police
officer.41
The use of physical force in the administration
of blood alcohol tests would present a lesser prob-
lem if there were wider use of the so-called implied
consent approach, The apparent reluctance to
adopt the approach can be attributed to two fac-
tors. First, it is a relatively new concept." Second,
some states have imposed so many administrative
restrictions and limitations upon the conduct of
chemical tests called for in the standard implied
consent law that the police hesitate to apply
them.49 It is in these states that the results of this
law have been disappointing.
These problems can and should be overcome.
The adoption of implied consent laws should in-
46 This position of the American Medical Association
was stated by Mr. Richard P. Bergan, Director of
Legal Research, Law Division, the American Medical
Association, in an interview with the authors.
47 N.Y. VEmcLE AND TRArFic LAW, §1194 id.
'aThe term "consent" seems out of place in that the
traditional concept of the term, generally applicable to
search and seizure situations, requires that there be no
coercion and that the consent must be "freely given."
Amos v. U.S., 255 U.S. 313, (1921); Judd v. U.S., 190
F.2d 649, (D.C. Cir. 1951); Ray v. U.S., 84 F.2d 654
(5th Cir. 1936); Holt v. State, 17 Wis. 2d 46S, 117
N.W.2d 626 (1962). The threat of suspension of an
operator's license, no matter how construed, smacks of
coercion.
11 For example, in Vermont a chemical test cannot be
given to an unconscious suspect. The suspect must be
given the opportunity to refuse to take the test and
also be given an option as to which of three forms of
testing he would prefer. In any test a sample must be
provided to the suspect for analysis by his own physi-
cian if he so desires. See, T.23 §1188-1194, VERmoNlr
ANN. STAT.
Some states have weakened their implied consent
laws in other ways. For example, North Carolina has
no provision for the automatic suspension of operator's
licenses, but a refusal to take the test will be admitted
as evidence in court. N.C. GEN. STAT. §20-16.2 (1965).
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dude strict enforcement of suspension of operator's
licenses and provision, for greater use, of the sus-
pect's breath as a means df measuring the amount
of alcohol in his blood. This would eliminate many
of the problems raised by the blood-alcohol ap-
proach. Finally, the states should draft implied
consent laws that are free of the numerous restric-
tion and limitations which now render them in-
effective as a law enforcement tool. In short, the
states would be wise to adopt a law closely related
to the implied consent provision of the Uniform
Vehicle Code.
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